Smart meter privacy by suprression of low power frequency components by Djordjevic, Slobodan et al.
Smart meter privacy by suppression of low power 
frequency components 
 
Srđan Đorđević and Marko Dimitrijević 
Faculty of Electronic Engineering 
University of Niš 
Niš, Serbia  
{srdjan.djordjevic, marko.dimitrijevic}@elfak.ni.ac.rs 
Slobodan Bojanić 
Escuela Tecnica Superior de Ing. de Telecomunicacion 
Universidad Politecnica de Madrid 
Madrid, Spain 
slobodan@die.upm.es
 
 
Abstract—This paper focuses on the problems associated with 
privacy protection in smart grid. We will give an overview of a 
possible realization of a privacy-preserving approach that 
encompasses privacy-utility tradeoff into a single model. This 
approach proposes suppression of low power frequency 
components as a solution to reduce the amount of information 
leakage from smart meter readings. We will consider the 
applicability of the procedure to hide the appliance usage with 
respect to the type of home devices. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The increased interest in modern power systems or smart 
grid is a consequence of the fact that the traditional power 
system is not able to meet growing energy demands. Smart grid 
characterizes the two-way flow of electricity and information, 
which allows more effectively monitoring and control of 
energy use. Smart meter periodically and automatically 
transmits readings to the utility which enables efficient load 
balancing. However, collecting and transmitting measuring 
data also poses a serious privacy threat since an unauthorized 
third party is able to intercept data in transmission. They could 
process power consumption data to extract appliance usage and 
observe some events. This information together with 
demographic data provide an opportunity to model a typical 
human behavior [1]. 
Any privacy preserving technique makes a tradeoff 
between privacy and data collection requirements. The first 
attempt to develop a general theoretical framework for privacy-
utility tradeoff  was proposed by Sankar et al. [2]. Such 
theoretical framework enables us to make a compromise 
between the lost of privacy and the precision of aggregated 
measurements. The second benefit of a theoretical abstraction 
is a possibility to create procedures which are technology-
independent. It is shown that an optimal compromise between 
privacy preserving and utility can be achieved by filtering out 
low power frequency components. 
This paper focuses on the technological defenses against 
unwanted and unauthorized monitoring. The following section 
is related to the Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring (NILM). In the 
third section we investigate realization of a privacy-preserving 
approach that encompasses privacy-utility tradeoff into a single 
model. The fourth section considers the applicability of the 
proposed technique to hide the appliance usage with respect to 
the type of home devices. 
II. NON-INTRUSIVE LOAD MONITORING  
The metering data which smart meter transmits to the utility 
provide an opportunity to observe the daily activities of a 
person remotely. If an attacker intercepts data in transmission 
he is able to determine individual appliance operation 
schedules by using NILM algorithm. Therefore the smart grid 
privacy solutions must carefully examine how NILM algorithm 
can be used to extract personal information and develop more 
effective means of protection from it. 
In order to save energy and use energy resource efficiently 
it is necessary to implement the load identification of 
appliances in individual households. The traditional load 
monitoring system which is based on Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) requires sensors attached to each 
appliance in the house and a home area network. The 
implementation of this system is very complex. In addition, it 
is unreliable and not scalable as a consequence of the large 
number of sensors. 
The second method used to detect the operation state of 
individual electric appliances is NILM, proposed by Schweppe 
and Hart [3]. This method uses the nonintrusive monitoring 
concept by which individual loads need not be instrumented. 
An NILM system uses only aggregate power consumption 
signals from a sensor at the power service entrance. This load 
monitoring method is widely accepted because of the simple 
hardware installation.  
The appliance signature represents a specific characteristic 
that makes a load unique. There are two main classes of 
nonintrusive signatures:  
• Steady-state   
• Transient  
The steady-state signature (SS) represents the set of 
parameters that are derived under steady-state operation of the 
appliances. The NILM methods which use this kind of 
signature identify devices based on the steady state change of 
real and reactive power. The behavior of some appliances can 
be tracked from positive and negative real power variations. 
According to the method proposed by Hart step changes of the 
power consumption are grouped into clusters in order to extract 
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individual appliance usage. The important advantages of the 
steady state approach are: minimal hardware requirements, low 
sampling frequency and additivity of the SS signatures. 
Any load identification algorithm needs to employ a library 
of load models during pattern recognition stage. In order to 
build a signature library, it is necessary to make a classification 
of electric home appliances.  
A. Electric appliance classification  
The electric equipments can be classified into following six 
categories depending on the electrical characteristics [4]: 
resistive appliances, motor driven appliances, pump operated 
appliances, electronically-fed appliances, electronic power 
control appliances and fluorescent lighting. 
The classification is performed based on the: duration and 
shape of the current transients, current harmonics and the other 
parameters of the voltage or current signal. Resistive 
appliances draw current that is in phase with the voltage. 
Therefore, there is the only real power present on the electrical 
network. The current signal drawn by resistive appliances does 
not contain higher harmonics. 
The second category of electric equipments contains an 
electric motor. The current signal drawn by motor driven 
appliances characterize a long transient and presence of odd-
numbered harmonics. The appliances which contain a pump 
operated by an electric motor are often classified separately 
from other motor driven appliances, because the differences in 
switching-on transients. Common household appliances that 
belong to this category include refrigerators, freezers, washing 
machines etc.  
Electronically-fed appliances are low power loads which 
use Switch Mode Power Supply (SMPS). The fundamental 
characteristic of any SMPS is high power efficiency and 
controllability. The SMPS current has a significant amount of 
triplen harmonics (3rd, 9th, 15th, etc.) and high THD. 
Electronic power control appliances are loads which 
characteristic significantly depend on power level at which 
they operate. Appliances such as halogen lights, some vacuum 
cleaners and cookers belong to this group. 
Fluorescent light sources belong to the inductive loads 
which characterize a substantial phase shift between current 
and voltage and a long two-step switching on transient. They 
posses current spectrum dominated by third harmonic.  
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING TECHNIQUE BASED  
ON PRIVACY-UTILITY TRADEOFF  
There are two approaches in the privacy preserving 
techniques proposed so far, non-cryptographic approaches and 
cryptographic approaches. Cryptographic techniques allow 
operation of the utility without access to meter readings. The 
main drawback of this approach is demand to implement 
protocols, and software on each smart meter. 
The privacy-preserving techniques can be centralized or 
distributed. The more common approach uses data aggregation, 
which performs gathering and computing data in a gateway.  
The second approach is to use security techniques on the side 
of the smart meter which communicate directly to the utility.  
The technique which ensures household privacy without 
utility cooperation is masking and obfuscation of metering 
data. One such solution named, Battery-based Load Hiding 
(BLH) [5, 6], uses controllable batteries which are charged and 
discharged at strategic times to hide the load demand. The 
BLH algorithm tries to prevent NILM by keeping metered load 
constant. 
The theoretical framework proposed by Sankar et al. [2] 
shows that optimal privacy preserving solution requires 
suppression of low power frequency components. Low power 
frequency components are typically caused by short-lived 
fluctuations in energy consumption and reveal a great amount 
of information about human behavior. In contrast, frequency 
components that have high power are caused by continuously 
running appliances and contain much less information. A 
privacy-preserving technique which is based on utility-privacy 
preserving model must realize two functions, which are as 
follows [7]:  
• Estimation  of  harmonic  components  in  power  system 
• Removing certain frequency components from 
measuring data signal 
Traditionally, harmonic analysis of current or voltage signal 
is performed by using FFT algorithm or bandpass filtering. The 
FFT algorithm can be implemented only if the number of 
samples per period is an exponentiation of 2. Therefore, one 
must determine the period of the fundamental frequency and 
adjust sampling frequency.  
The key part of the proposed privacy preserving technique 
is to determine active power harmonics that can be suppressed. 
Removing the frequency components must be done adaptively 
from the power consumption spectrum.  
The complex power can be expressed in terms of the active 
and reactive power harmonics in the following way: 
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The proposed procedure of removing low power frequency 
components from measuring data signal results in the 
approximated active and reactive power, as follows: 
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where: M is the set of harmonics which are suppressed. 
The approximation is acceptable if the active power relative 
error does not exceed the upper limit, δp. 
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All other power quality measurements are performed 
without any approximation since they do not reveal privacy 
information. 
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IV. MEASUREMENTS 
A. Measurement conditions and setup 
Measurements and data analysis are performed using a real-
time system for polyphase nonlinear loads analysis, described 
in [8]. The system is based on virtual instrument paradigm, 
using National Instruments NI9225 and NI9227 acquisition 
modules and PXI controller running real-time operating system 
(RTOS). In these measurements, we used 50 kSa/s sampling 
rate and 24bit accuracy. The current and voltage ranges are 
±5ARMS and ±300VRMS, respectively. All measurements are 
conducted using one acquisition channel, i.e. one phase. 
The current spectra and waveforms are shown on Fig. 1 to 
5. Fig.1 presents a current spectrum and waveform in case of 
pure linear resistive load, 100 W nominal power incandescent 
lamp. This measurement is given as reference. The waveform 
is almost sinusoidal, and one can observe small magnitude of 
3rd, 5th and 7th harmonics. These harmonics exist due to power 
grid supply voltage, which is not pure sinusoide, having some 
harmonic pollution. 
B. Results 
Fig. 2 and 3 depicts measured results for Compact 
Fluorescent Lights (CFL) lamps with 15W and 20W nominal 
power, respectively. The waveforms are almost identical, and 
both spectra have the same harmonic structure, with odd 
harmonics. The envelope of spectra is approximately 
exponentially decaying function, with a small drop in 5th 
harmonic. The only observable difference between two spectra 
is different magnitudes of same order harmonics. 
The measured data related to the CRT monitor are shown in 
Fig. 4. The waveform resembles the sine function. The 
spectrum contains low frequency components, i.e. 5th–9th 
harmonics, with small magnitude. This is an example of well 
compensated SMPS. 
Finally, Fig. 5 represents spectrum and waveform obtained 
by measuring portable PC supply current. This is an example 
of time non-invariant electronic appliance. The power 
consumption, as well as spectrum structure of such nonlinear 
load varies in time, depending on working conditions (i.e. 
battery status) and  activities within a PC, causing different 
CPU, GPU and I/O load [9].  This information can be also used 
for eavesdropping the computer activity, as shown in [10]. 
The measurements shown in Fig. 5 are performed with 
fully charged battery, when PC is in idle state – only OS and 
core services running. The AC/DC power converter draws 
current from the grid in bursts, causing heavily distorted 
waveform. The corresponding spectrum contains odd 
harmonics, with sinc function as envelope. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Incandescent lamp, 100W nominal power – spectrum (left) and waveform (right) 
 
Figure 2.  15W nominal power CFL – spectrum (left) and waveform (right) 
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Figure 3.  20W nominal power CFL – spectrum (left) and waveform (right) 
 
Figure 4.  CRT monitor – spectrum (left) and waveform (right) 
 
Figure 5.  Portable PC – spectrum (left) and waveform (right) 
V. CONCLUSION 
By observing measured results, especially related spectra, 
one can conclude that each electronic appliance has unique 
harmonic signature, which can be used for identification. 
Identifying single appliance connected into power grid requires 
complex pattern based algorithms. 
 In this proceeding, we only take in consideration harmonic 
magnitudes. Harmonic phases can also be measured with 
described system, providing more information needed for 
appliance identification. 
The proposed privacy-preserving technique is applicable to 
appliances with a current spectrum having relatively strong 
higher harmonics. Hence, the suppression of low-power 
frequency components is not effective on resistive appliances. 
According to the measurement results, the usage of 
electronically-fed and electronic power control appliances can 
be effectively hidden. This group of appliances encompasses 
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household appliances such as IT equipment (mainly 
computers), television sets, energy-efficient lighting (LED and 
CFL) which are becoming nowadays more prevalent in 
households. 
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